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Abstract 
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission – which was appointed by the U.S. 
Government to investigate the recent financial crisis – issued its Report on January 
27, 2011.  Among the many causes identified by the Commission, one was the failure 
of corporate governance and risk management at many leading financial institutions. 
This was the second time in a single decade that corporate governance issues had 
come to occupy the media limelight. The first time was the in the early years of the 
twenty-first century when the corporate crises at some high-profile public companies 
had led to a severe loss of confidence in the securities markets. For these among a host 
of other reasons, corporate governance has become a burgeoning field of study among 
scholars of law, economics, finance, management, and other cognate disciplines. 
The book The Modern Corporation and Private Property, by Adolf Berle and Gardiner 
Means, first published in 1932, continues to be a foundational work for the study of 
corporate law and governance. One striking feature of the book is the richness of its 
insights and their significance which still inspire debate and analysis among corporate 
law scholars almost eight decades after its initial publication. This essay provides a 
short explanation of the context in which The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
was written along with a brief note of some of the major developments in corporate 
law and governance. The essay also provides an overview of the prominent themes 
that continue to be debated and discussed among corporate law and governance 
scholars. This essay makes the claim that one underappreciated aspect of The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property is its recognition of corporate law as being akin 
to constitutional law for a new economic age. The evolving norms of corporate 
governance and their adaptation to the exigencies of the times reveal a pattern that 
sits well with the thesis of living constitutionalism.
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We are well underway toward recognition that property used in
production must conform to conceptions of civilization worked out
through civilized processes of American constitutional government.
Few American enterprises, and no large corporations, can take the
view that their plants, tools and organizations are their own, and that
they can do what they please with their own. There is increasing 
recognition of the fact that collective operations, and those 
predominantly conducted by large corporations, are like operations
carried on by the state itself.1 
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
Preface to the Revised Edition
I. Introduction:
Corporate governance has been a burgeoning field of study in recent years among 
legal, management, financial, and other academics, and also among those involved in 
the nuts-and-bolts of dealing with its practical issues as managers, practicing lawyers, 
accountants, and other cognate professionals.2  
A prominent recent instance of the public attention that corporate governance 
has received is contained in the Report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
which was issued on January 27, 20113 The Commission was appointed by the United 
States Government in 2009 to investigate the causes of the financial and economic 
crisis in the United States that began in December 2007. It was the worst such crisis 
since the 1930s and has had severe worldwide repercussions. Among the many causes 
identified by the Commission, one of the important findings was that“dramatic 
failure of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically important 
1  Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
Preface at xxvi, (Revised edition, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968). (First edition, 
1932).
2  For an overview of current issues relating to corporate governance, see Lucian 
A. Bebchuk and Michael S. Weisbach, The State of Corporate Governance Research, 
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 23, No.3, at 939-961.
3  The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the 
Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (U.S. Government 
Printing Office). Available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
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financial institutions were a key cause of this crisis.”4 Earlier, the need for corporate 
governance reform had already been anticipated by the“say on pay”and“proxy 
access”provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
which was signed into law on July 21, 2010, and had been enacted in response to the 
financial and economic crisis.5  
This was the second time in a single decade that corporate governance had come 
to occupy the media limelight. The first time was in the early years of the decade 
when the egregious corporate scandals at high-profile public companies such as Enron, 
Tyco, Worldcom, and others led to a collapse in their share prices and to a crisis of 
confidence in the securities markets. The U.S. Congress had responded to that situation 
by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20026 which imposed stringent compliance 
requirements upon U.S. companies. The Act has been criticized by some on the 
grounds that the complexity of the regulatory mechanism it has put in place and the 
compliance requirements that it has imposed disadvantage American corporations 
vis-à-vis foreign competitors. Others have praised the Act for having restored public 
confidence in the accuracy of the information contained in corporate financial 
statements and in the securities markets.
In any event, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act continues to provoke comment and 
discussion, as the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 and the provisions of the Dodd-Frank 
Act are likely to do over the coming years. Thereby, corporate governance is almost 
certainly going to remain a prominent topic of public discourse in the years ahead.
It is no surprise then, that Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s co-authored classic, 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property7 (hereafter The Modern Corporation) has 
been the subject of so much contemporary legal scholarship. Although first published 
4  Id. at xviii. The dissenting statement of three of the ten members effectively concurs 
on this point although the words “corporate governance” are not expressly used. 
See id. at 427 to429. 
5  See generally: J.W.Verret, Defending Against Shareholder Proxy Access: Delaware’s 
Future Reviewing Company Defenses in the Era of Dodd-Frank, George Mason Law 
& Economics Research Paper No. 10-37. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1655482.
6  Pub.L. 107-204, 117 Stat. 745, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdys/pkg/PLAW-
107pub1204/content-detail.html.
7  Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
supra note 1.
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in 1932, The Modern Corporation remains the foundational work for the study of 
corporate law and governance. The book continues to be analyzed and debated almost 
eight decades after its initial publication. Cases in point are two recent symposium 
issues of the Seattle University Law Review intended to mark the founding of the“Adolf 
A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporation, Law and Society”at that University which 
showcase some outstanding contemporary legal scholarship on Berle and Means’s 
classic work.8 This is in addition to a wide array of other scholarship on the subject. 
This essay has been prompted by a recent re-reading of Modern Corporation and 
some of the erudite scholarship on the book and its purport. One striking feature of 
the book is the richness of its insights and their continuing relevance. One prominent 
feature of the scholarship is the wide array of conflicting interpretations that Modern 
Corporation has been subjected to and the diverse theses that the book has been 
adduced in support of. This essay makes the claim that this multiplicity of theses and 
interpretations are capable of being reconciled when viewed in the light of Berle and 
Means’s assertion which runs as a subtext through the entire book－and is set out most 
succinctly in the final paragraph－that the law of corporations is akin to constitutional 
law for a new economic age. Proponents of living constitutionalism would have no 
difficulty in squaring the diversity of scholarly exegeses with Berle and Means’s claim.
After the present introduction, this essay has been organized as follows: Part II 
delineates the areas that are subsumed under the rubric of corporate governance; Part 
III explains in a brief outline form the context in which The Modern Corporation was 
written and published; Part IV presents an overview of the contents of the book and its 
principal theses; Part V describes some of the major developments relating to corporate 
law and corporate governance; Part VI sets out the principal claim of this essay that 
the continuously evolving norms of corporate law and governance in the United 
States are in conformity with the subtext of The Modern Corporation which likens the 
law of corporations to constitutional law for a new age. The essay ends with a brief 
conclusion.
8  See 33 Seattle University Law Review (2010), and 34 Seattle University Law 
Review (2011).
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II. The Mechanism of Corporate Governance:
Apart from business corporations, the two principal forms of business organization 
are sole proprietorships and partnerships. The term“corporation”is principally used in 
the United States, whereas the term“company”is more commonly used in the United 
Kingdom and the countries in the British Commonwealth.
Corporate governance encompasses the totality of the system designed to shape 
and control corporations. In various ways, issues relating to corporate governance have 
been present ever since the inception of the corporate form. As far back as 1776, in his 
magnum opus The Wealth of Nations,9 Adam Smith had recognized a problem relating 
to corporate governance, the solution to which continues to remain elusive. The 
problem that Adam Smith identified was: When professional managers are entrusted 
with the task of managing money which is not their own, in the nature of things they 
would not bring to the task the same level of vigilance and industry that they would if 
it were their own. 
In modern times, corporate governance issues arise mainly in connection with 
publicly traded corporations.10 The major concern remains the need to regulate the 
behavior of managers in ways that would lead them to act in the best interest of the 
shareholders, or the stakeholders, rather than in their own. 
The term“coporate governance”collectively refers to mandatory rules and laws 
as also developing doctrines and norms designed to control corporations. Following is 
a brief outline of the various internal and external mechanisms that together form the 
subject matter of corporate governance.11  
A. Shareholders: The shareholders of the corporation are an important part of the 
corporate governance system to the extent that they can influence the direction of the 
corporation. In the past, dispersed individual investors formed the bulk of the share 
9  Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 606-607 
(Penn State Press ed. 2005) (1776).
10 There were about 16,000 publicly traded corporations in the United States in 2002. 
SEC, Framework for Enhancing the Quality of Financial Information, 67 Fed.
Reg.44,999 (July 5, 2002).
11 For a fairly comprehensive recent explanation of the contours of corporate 
governance, see Arthur R. Pinto, An Overview of United States Corporate Governance in 
Publicly Traded Corporations (October 22, 2009). Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies 
Paper no. 172. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1492735. This section 
draws  upon this overview.
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ownership and they could have very little say in the running of the corporation. In 
recent years, the large numbers of institutional shareholders are in a better position to 
influence the direction of the corporation. Through their political vote, shareholders 
can also influence the shaping of corporate laws. 
B. Law: The law governing corporations consists of the federal law enacted by the 
U.S. Congress, the state law enacted by the legislature in each state, and the common 
law as embodied in the judgments of the state and federal judiciary. 
Among federal laws, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934 which, inter alia, established the Securities and Exchange Commission are 
the most important. More recently, the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank legislation are 
also significant. 
Delaware state law, because of its business-friendly nature among other reasons, 
has come to occupy the pre-eminent position among laws governing corporations.
C. Internal corporate structure: The internal corporate structure refers to the rules 
governing the power arrangements among the principal constituents, that is, the 
board of directors, the management, and the shareholders. There is always a need 
for a delicate balance between shareholder rights and the need for management to 
have the freedom to promote in all legal and legitimate ways the business interest of 
the corporation. These rules relate to shareholder voting, proxy voting, independent 
directors, and other cognate issues.
 
III. The Context of The Modern Corporation and Private Property :
To understand the context in which The Modern Corporation was first published, 
it would be useful to briefly review the evolution of the corporate form in the United 
States.12 
In pre-Independence America, there were three types of corporations – public, 
private, and commercial13 and their number was insignificant. In the early years of 
the American Republic, corporations were those that were granted charters by the 
government, and these were widely understood as being privileges granted at the 
12 For a very good survey of this historical development, see: P.M. Vasudev, Corporate 
Law and its Efficiency: A Review of History, 50 American Journal of Legal History, 237-
283 (2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract: 1537985.
13 See: Joseph Stancliffe Davis, Essays on the Earlier History of American Corporations 
(Harvard University Press, 1917).
183BULLETIN OF KYUSHU WOMEN'S UNIVERSITY     Vol.48 No.1
discretion of the legislature. For various cultural and historical reasons, there was a 
widespread wariness of this aspect of corporations. A total number of 335 corporations 
were chartered in the United States in the two decades from 1781 to 1800.14 There 
was, during this period, a deep understanding of the positives and the negatives of the 
corporate form.15 
A truly revolutionary change was initiated during Andrew Jackson’s presidency 
from 1829 to 1837.16 To counter the hostility toward discretion and privilege, calls for 
reform led to a democratization of the corporate form in the shape of enactment of laws 
granting a general right of incorporation to anyone who wished to do so. Beginning 
with New York in 1846 laws relating to general incorporation had been enacted in 
36 states by 1902.17 The right to incorporate now became a general right available 
to anyone subject to compliance with certain minimum mandatory rules expressly 
provided in the statute. The enactment of general incorporation laws did not by itself 
end the system of granting corporate privileges under charters. The two systems 
remained simultaneously in effect. 
The economic expansion during the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century, 
the surge in business activity, and the rise of dynamic business leaders such as John 
Rockefeller and others led to changes in corporate law after 1880. Corporate law 
was seen as a hindrance rather than as a facilitator of economic growth. This led to 
the formation of the legal device known as“trusts.”A trust was a legal stratagem 
intended to circumvent state laws prohibiting a corporation from holding extra-
territorial property, or stock of another company. These trusts were viewed with 
concern because of the market power that they exercised.18 New Jersey was the 
first state to enact a statute that permitted one corporation to hold shares in another 
corporation. It had already been held by the U.S. Supreme Court that a corporation 
chartered in one state could do business in any other state.19 Thus, this law greatly 
facilitated business expansion and economic growth. It also served as an incentive for 
14 Id., at 26.
15 See Stuart Banner, Anglo-American Securities Regulation: Political and Cultural Roots, 
1690-1860, at 210 (Cambridge University Press, 1998).
16 P.M. Vasudev, supra note 12, at 19 (SSRN).
17 Id. at 20. 
18 See generally: Maury Klein, The Genesis of Industrial America, 1870-1920 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007).
19 Bank of August v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519.
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corporations to make New Jersey the preferred state of incorporation, leading in turn 
to a competition among states to provide corporations with an environment congenial 
for conducting business. One such state was Delaware which enacted general 
incorporation laws in 1899.
At the start of the twentieth century, mergers of small-scale manufacturing firms 
led to the creation of huge enterprises that gained a pre-eminent market position and 
retained it for decades.20 Along with the growth of the giant corporations, came a steep 
rise in the number of individual stockholders in publicly traded corporations with a 
particularly dramatic rise taking place in the 1920s.21 The end of the twenties decade 
saw the arrival of the Great Depression, amidst which The Modern Corporation was first 
published. 
IV. The Modern Corporation  and Its Themes:
Berle and Means began to work on The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
in 1927. At that time, Adolf Berle was a professor of corporate law at Columbia Law 
School, while Gardiner C. Means was a graduate student of economics at Columbia 
University. He had earlier been a graduate student at Harvard University. Reflecting 
the specialized fields of study of its authors, the book examines the evolution of big 
business from legal and economic perspectives. The Modern Corporation was first 
published in 1932. The book is best known for two themes. The first is the separation 
of ownership and control in the modern corporation. The second is a somewhat 
ambiguous stance on whether a corporation should be run principally in the interest of 
its shareholders or its stakeholders. 
The Modern Corporation traces the evolution of corporations and notes the extent 
to which a small number of huge corporations had come to accumulate an enormous 
concentration of economic power. Due to the extent of their size, stock ownership had 
become increasingly dispersed. This dispersal had led to an inability on the part of the 
shareholders to effectively engage in directing the affairs of the corporation. As Berle 
and Means noted:
20 Naomi Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895-1904 
(Cambridge University Press,1985).
21 See generally: Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Speculation Economy: How Finance Triumphed 
over Industry (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc.,2007).
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In place of actual physical properties over which the owner could
exercise direction and for which he was responsible, the owner
now holds a piece of paper representing a set of rights and
expectations with respect to an enterprise. But over the enterprise
and over the physical property – the instruments of production – 
in which he has an interest, the owner has little control.22 
As the actual owner of the property ceded control over it, the control vested in the 
board of directors or of management. Shareholders increasingly came to think of their 
stock as investments which bore dividend payouts and had a market value. This led to 
further management autonomy and increasing unaccountability, which in turn raised 
serious social and economic issues. 
According to the conventional logic of the profit motive, economic profit should go 
to the person who is in actual control so as to motivate him to work more efficiently 
and more effectively. On the other hand, traditional notions of property dictated that 
economic profit should go to the shareholders in their capacity as the rightful owners. 
However, in light of the separation of ownership and control, the prevailing ideas of 
profits and property no longer applied. The new situation had catapulted the interest 
of society at large over that of either management or the shareholders. 
Following is an exploration of the principal themes of The Modern Corporation. 
A. The Separation of Ownership and Control:
It is generally believed that Berle and Means were the first scholars to identify 
the issue of the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation. In an 
illuminating article, Harwell Wells has pointed out that there were other illustrious 
scholars who paved the way for Berle and Means although they had interpreted the 
situation differently.23 In Wells’s telling, the great achievement of Berle and Means 
was in highlighting the issue within the framework of the growth in the American 
economy and in explaining what the consequences of the separation entailed for 
society at large.
     Some prominent intellectual forebears of Berle and Means were Louis Brandeis, 
22 Berle and Means, supra note 1, at 64. 
23 Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 Seattle University Law Review 
1247 (2010). This section draws upon the article by Harwell Wells.
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who later became a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, influential journalist Walter 
Lippmann, economist Thorstein Veblen, and William Z. Ripley.
Brandeis expressed his concern in 1914.24 In his view, the dispersion of share 
ownership and the resulting inability of shareholders to partake in the management 
of the corporation led to their dependence on bankers to evaluate the worth of their 
securities resulting in a shift of power into the hands of bankers. 
Walter Lippmann recognized the separation of ownership and control in 1913 in 
his book Drift and Mastery.25 However, he did not consider it a problem for society but 
as something beneficial. In his view, since the salaried manager would have no selfish 
interest at stake in the profit of the corporation, he would be more inclined to think of 
the effect of his decisions on society at large. 
Thorstein Veblen first observed the separation of ownership and control in his 
1904 book, Theory of the Business Enterprise.26 However, he noted its consequences 
in the light of his understanding of corporate finance of that period. He saw it as a 
problem between managers who owned preferred stock and had a prior claim on the 
corporeal assets of the firm, as opposed to the ordinary shareholders. 
Another major book which highlighted the separation of ownership and control 
was Main Street and Wall Street by William Z. Ripley.27 Adolf Berle noted Ripley’s 
contribution in the introduction to The Modern Corporation.28 Ripley had observed that 
“[t]he prime fact confronting us as a nation is the progressive diffusion of ownership 
on the one hand and the ever-increasing concentration of managerial power on the 
other.”29  
However, it was the publication of The Modern Corporation in 1932 which 
truly catapulted the issue of the separation of ownership and control into public 
consciousness. The book’s strengths flowed from its use of  copious empirical and 
statistical data and elaborate factual and conceptual arguments. One particularly 
striking new move was the mooting of“control”as a concept apart from ownership 
24 Louis Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It (F. A. Stokes,1914).
25 Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery (Prentice-Hall 1961) (1914).
26 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of Business Enterprise (The New American Library 
1904).
27 William Z. Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street (Little, Brown, and Company,1927).
28 Berle and Means, supra note 1, at xlii.
29 Ripley, supra note 27, at 131.
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and management. This“control,”according to Berle and Means vested with those 
who were in a position to appoint the board of directors, and thereby influence the 
direction of the corporation. 
The concern about the separation of ownership and control was the“agency 
cost”that would potentially follow in its wake. 
      
B. For Whose Benefit Is the Corporation To Be Run?
Flowing from the primary theme about the separation of ownership and control 
there emerged a consequential theme: For whose benefit is the corporation to be run?
This theme had already been anticipated in a debate between Adolf Berle and 
Merrick Dodd of Harvard Law School in the pages of the Harvard Law Review.30 
Adolf Berle took up the position that“all powers granted to a corporation or to the 
management of a corporation, or to any group within the corporation・・・[are] at all 
times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest 
appears.”31 Merrick Dodd, on the other hand, took the position that the purpose of a 
business corporation was not merely to make a profit for the shareholders but also to 
serve the interests of society. Berle and Dodd are widely believed to be the respective 
forerunners of what have come to be called“shareholder primacy”and“corporate 
social responsibility.”However, as William Bratton and Michael Wachter have pointed 
out, this is an oversimplified characterization of their positions.32 Both Berle and Dodd 
had more nuanced views about the purpose of a corporation and both refined their 
positions over the years as the context changed. 
It is equally unclear what position Berle and Means advocated in The Modern 
Corporation. Once again, as William Bratton and Michael Wachter have pointed out, 
Books II and III of Modern Corporation take the stand that managers must function 
as trustees of shareholders whereas Books I and IV urge that the managers attend to 
30 Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harvard Law Review 1049 
(1931), E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? 45 Harvard Law 
Review 1145 (1932). 
31 Adolf Berle, id., at 1049. 
32 William W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: 
Adolf Berle and “The Modern Corporation,” 34 Journal of Corporation Law 99 (2008).
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the larger question of the welfare of society.33 Bratton and Wachter have argued that 
the book was written over a long period of gestation, and those years were politically, 
economically, and socially tumultuous years. Berle’s views were context-specific and 
were modified with the changing times.
In any event, it was another signal achievement of The Modern Corporation that 
questions relating to the true purpose of the corporation were propelled to the forefront 
of public discourse. Debate on this question remains unabated. Berle himself had 
refined his position in later years, and leaned toward a manager-oriented model that 
supported giving wide discretion to managers in the running of the corporation in the 
belief that professional managers would act as fiduciaries for the social good.
Corporate social responsibility is also the subject of a recurring debate that 
has persisted since the publication of The Modern Corporation. The case for greater 
corporate social responsibility waxes and wanes in lockstep with the changing 
economic, political, and social context.34  
In recent years, due to the corporate failures of the first decade of the twenty-
first century, special emphasis has been placed upon director independence under the 
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The underlying theory is that more rigorous 
oversight by the Board of Directors will deter management from using corporate 
resources for self- aggrandizement.
Despite a host of post-publication developments, such as a questioning of 
the premises of The Modern Corporation by those who argue for a conception of a 
corporation as a“nexus-of-contracts,”35 Berle and Means’s principal thesis continues 
to hold sway in scholarly debate. The book has been subjected to a host of conflicting 
interpretations that have varied with the ebb and flow of political, social, and 
economic events in the United States.
33 William W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of the 
Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 Seattle University Law Review 849 (2010).
34 For a comprehensive chronicle of the corporate social responsibility debate, see 
Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective 
for the Twenty-First Century, 51 University of Kansas Law Review 77 (2002).
35 See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, in Michael C. Jensen, A Theory of the 
Firm: Governance, Residual Claims and Organizational Forms (Harvard University 
Press, 2000).
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V. Major Steps In the Development of Corporate Law:
Corporations have played an important role in the economic development of the 
United States, and in the shaping of cultural attitudes of its people. This is reflected in 
the development of the law relating to corporations in the United States. 
The Supreme Court of the United States and other federal and state courts have 
played a role in the development of laws relating to corporations. Herewith is a brief 
recapitulation of a few of the major landmark decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that 
have had major ramifications for the development of corporate law.36 This account 
covers only a few of the high points and is not comprehensive.
The first major case was that of McCulloch v. Maryland,37 which was decided by 
the United States Supreme Court in 1819. This case related, in part, to the power of 
the United States Congress to charter a bank although no such power was expressly 
granted in the U.S. Constitution. The Court held that Congress did have such a power 
and it flowed from the Necessary and Proper Clause in furtherance of effectuating the 
express powers granted to Congress under the taxing and spending clause. The power 
of Congress to enact laws relating to economic, monetary, and financial matters was 
thereby established. 
In the same year, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the case of Trustees of Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward38 that the corporate charter granted in 1769 by King George III 
to the trustees of Dartmouth College under which the College had been founded was 
tantamount to a contract and the act of the state legislature seeking to impair its 
provisions violated the Contract Clause set out in Article 1, section 10, Clause 1 of the 
36 See generally: Lydie Nadia Cabrera Pierre-Louis, Corporate Law: A Historical 
Perspective of the Supreme Court’s Corporate Law Decisions from the Nineteenth Century 
to the Present, in Encyclopedia of the Supreme Court of the United States, Volume 1, at 
443 to 451 (David S. Tanenhaus, Editor, Macmillan Reference USA, 2008).
37 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). Writing the opinion of the Court, Chief 
Justice Marshall memorably wrote:“We must never forget that it is a Constitution 
we are expounding…intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be 
adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”Id., 407,415. These words are often 
cited as presaging the idea of a“living constitution.” 
38 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). In the 
Court’s opinion, Chief Justice Marshall described a corporation as“an artificial being 
…existing only in the contemplation of law.”In the early years of the twentieth 
century, jurists gradually began to reconfigure this into an understanding that 
postulated the corporation as a“real entity.”
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U.S. Constitution.
In the 1877 case of Munn v. Illinois,39 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the right of a 
state to regulate the rates of grain elevators charged by a company as it was deemed 
to be a business being conducted in the public interest. 
In furtherance of the aforesaid holding, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1886 in 
the Railroad Commission Cases40 that in spite of a charter contract granting railroad 
companies the right to fix reasonable charges, the state retained the right to determine 
what was reasonable in the absence of any express provision in the contract divesting 
the state of such right. Nevertheless, in a significant obiter dictum, the Court indicated 
that the ruling did not invest the state with the right to take any action that would 
amount to a taking without due process of law. 
This set the stage for the U.S. Supreme Court’s famous decision in the 1886 case 
of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company.41 The Court’s ruling in this 
case is conventionally understood to mean that the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution applied to corporations, too.42 
39 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.113 (1877).
40 Railroad Commission Cases, 106 U.S. 307 (1886).
41 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
42 The headnote to the case in the U.S. Reports reads:
“The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision 
in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to  these 
corporations. We are of the opinion that it does.”
Id. at 396. The actual text of the opinion of the Court, however, does not include 
this statement.
A corporation is not vested with the rights associated with citizenship, such as the 
right to vote. However, citizenship has not been considered to be an essential pre-
requisite for the enjoyment of various rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. In 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court 
recognized a corporation’s right to free speech under the First Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution. This was later made subject to reasonable restrictions in Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). In various decisions, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has also recognized a corporation’s constitutional rights under the 
First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
See Scott R. Bowman, Corporate Citizenship in Encyclopedia of the American 
Constitution at 688 (Second Edition, Edited by Leonard W. Levy and Kenneth L. 
Karst, Macmillan Reference, 2000).
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In the 1897 case of Allgeyer v. Louisiana,43 the U.S. Supreme Court extended the 
meaning of the word“liberty”as used in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to encompass not merely the sense of freedom 
from physical restraint but also freedom to do all lawful acts necessary in pursuance of 
a lawful calling. The entity in question in this case was a corporation. However, the 
question of corporate personhood was not at issue as the impugned statute expressly 
covered corporations along with persons and firms. 
Another significant U.S. Surpreme Court judgment was delivered in the 1938 case, 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.44 In this case, the Supreme Court held that in a diversity 
action, provided that the Constitution or acts of Congress did not govern, it was 
incumbent upon federal courts to apply not only statutory law but state common law 
as well. In subsequent cases, the Court limited the application of this principle to state 
substantive law and not to procedural law. However, this had significant ramifications 
for the development of corporate law inasmuch as it paved the way for the rise of 
Delaware state law in matters relating to corporate law and governance.
A recent case relating to corporate personhood has been the decision of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, 
Inc.45 decided on March 1, 2011, in which the Court denied corporations the right to 
“personal privacy”for the purpose of Exemption 7 (C) of the Freedom of Information 
Act.  
After the Court’s judgment in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, state law, particularly 
Delaware state law, has played a major role in the shaping of corporate law. More 
than half of all publicly traded corporations in the United States are incorporated in 
Delaware.
Federal securities laws have important implications for companies. Some of the 
most important of these laws were enacted during the thirties, during the Franklin 
Roosevelt presidency in response to the economic crisis engendered by the Great 
Depression. The most prominent of these are: the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Trust 
Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment 
43 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
44 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
45 Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, 562 U.S. _____ (2011) (Decided March 1, 
2011).
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Advisers Act of 1940.     
It would also be useful to note the antitrust or competition laws that have been 
enacted over the years to curb the abuse of market power by giant corporations. In 
response to the accelerating rise of big business during the 1880s and 1890s, the 
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was enacted with a view to shift the regulatory 
power from the states to the federal government. The major antitrust laws that have 
followed are the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), the Clayton Antitrust Act (1914), the 
Federal Trade Commission Act (1914), the Robinson-Patman Act (1936), and the 
Celler-Kefauver Act (1950). All these Acts have had significant impact on the market 
activities of corporations and each was enacted in response to a felt societal need.
VI. Corporate Law and Governance as Constitutional Law:
Amidst the plethora of theories and interpretations that the Modern Corporation 
has been subjected to, one underappreciated point has been the ringing peroration at 
the end of the final chapter of the book in which Berle and Dodd liken corporate law 
to constitutional law for a new age. The concluding lines of the final paragraph read:
The rise of the modern corporation has brought a concentration of 
economic power which can compete on equal terms with the modern
state – economic power versus political power, each strong in its 
own field. The state seeks in some aspects to regulate the corporation,
while the corporation, steadily becoming more powerful, makes every
effort to avoid such regulation・・・・The future may see the economic
organism, now typified by the corporation, not only on an equal
plane with the state, but possibly even superseding it as the dominant
form of social organization. The law of corporations, accordingly,
might well be considered as a potential constitutional law for the
new economic state, while business practice is increasingly 
assuming the aspect of economic statesmanship.46  
Although it would be a stretch to say that the corporation or any other economic 
organism has in fact superseded the dominance of the state, Berle and Means’s 
statement is replete with foresight and wisdom. The collapse of mega-corporations 
such as Enron and Worldcom in the early years of the twenty-first century had an 
46 Berle and Means, supra note 1, at 313.
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impact on the lives of vast numbers of shareholders and stakeholders and upon society 
at large in the shape of  shaken confidence in corporate probity and the trustworthiness 
of the financial markets. This was further aggravated by the worldwide financial 
crisis in the latter years of the decade, triggered at least in part by failures of corporate 
governance in major financial institutions such as Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, 
and others, which impacted the lives of millions in the United States and consequently 
in other countries across the world. These events have once again highlighted in 
stark relief the overriding importance of laws and norms of corporate governance for 
the well-being – economic and otherwise – of the people of a nation. As the Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission Report has pointed out:“Businesses, large and small, have 
felt the sting of a deep recession. There is much anger about what has transpired, and 
justifiably so・・・・The collateral damage of this crisis has been real people and real 
communities. The impacts of this crisis are likely to be felt for a generation.”47 
Given these facts, it would not be incorrect to say that though the state remains 
the dominant form of social organization, and although constitutional law in its 
conventional sense continues to retain its pre-eminent status as the paramount law of 
the state, the law of corporations, along with the corporate governance norms that it 
engenders is almost as far-reaching in its impact and consequences as constitutional 
law.
The Modern Corporation was first published in 1932, during the difficult period 
of the Great Depression. There have been many developments and modifications in 
the law of corporations and in the norms of corporate governance since then. There 
have been see-sawing changes in the common understanding of some key concepts. 
There have been fluctuations in the primacy accorded to shareholders, stakeholders, 
managers, and directors. There have been inflections and changes in the societal 
understanding of the extent to which corporations have responsibility vis-à-vis society 
at large. In the light of some seeming contradictions within the book and Berle’s other 
writings, there have been divergences in the views regarding what Berle and Means 
really stood for and sought to canvass. There are conflicting claims about the validity 
of the arguments set forth by Berle and Means. There have been some deft conceptual 
plays such as the nexus-of-contracts approach seeking to supplant the understanding 
of the separation of ownership and control. 
47 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report, supra note 3, at xv and xvi.
194
The Modern Corporation and Private Property and the Evolving 
Norms of Corporate Governance (Nitin Datar)
These protean changes and vicissitudes emphasize, rather than detract from, the 
prescience of Berle and Means’s analogizing of the law of corporations to constitutional 
law. It is almost otiose to say that there are fundamental differences between 
constitutional law and the law of corporations. The most obvious of these is regarding 
the amendment procedure. The onerous procedural requirement set out in Article V 
of the U.S. Constitution is a major hurdle to surmount if any change is sought to be 
made in the provisions of the constitution. That is one of the major reasons why there 
have been only twenty-seven amendments to the U.S. Constitution over the space of 
over two centuries, the last one having been enacted on May 5, 1992.
For this reason, if there is any change of political or economic circumstances or 
of societal understanding that requires a constitutional provision to be viewed in a 
new light, it falls upon the courts to articulate anew the meaning of the constitutional 
provisions so as to reflect accurately the changing exigencies, mores, and expectations 
of the zeitgeist. Corporate law is not encumbered with comparable baggage. 
Strong arguments have been made to support a broader view of the constitution 
beyond the text that was ratified at the Philadelphia Convention in 1789 and the 
twenty-seven subsequent amendments.48 Proponents of a mode of interpretation termed 
as“living constitutionalism”believe that the meaning of the constitution cannot 
remain coagulated at what it was understood to mean at some particular moment in 
time such as its formal ratification, but that each generation should be called upon to 
mould its meaning to accord with the exigencies of its own era.49 Pragmatism is the 
hallmark of the principle of“living constitutionalism.”     
In an article in the Harvard Law Review, eminent constitutional scholar Bruce 
Ackerman has distinguished between what he terms the“official canon”and 
the“operational canon.”50 He describes the official canon as consisting of the 
Constitutional document ratified in 1789 and the subsequent amendments, but the 
48 For example, Sanford Levinson has argued for an understanding of the term 
“constitution”to include fundamental documents such as the Declaration of 
Independence and the Gettysburg Address and, beyond that, aspects of the American 
experience that cannot be reduced to a text at all.”Sanford Levinson, Constitutional 
Faith 185 (Princeton University Press,1988). 
49 Jack Balkin’s assertion that the constitution must embody the values and aspirations 
of the people fits in well with the idea of a living constitution. See: Original Meaning 
and Constitutional Redemption, Constitutional Commentary, Vol.24, 427, 461-466.
50 Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 Harvard Law Review 1737.
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operational canon as encompassing also“superprecedents”and landmark statutes. 
In answer to the question whether the Constitution is a machine or an organism, 
Ackerman states that both sides of the argument have an element of validity. Whereas 
the organicists support the common law method whereby“slowly, by half steps, the 
common law judge senses the changing patterns of social mores and keeps the law in 
tune with life,”51 the mechanists base their arguments on popular sovereignty. Bruce 
Ackerman concludes by stating that he favors an amalgam of both views“based on 
two organic developments – one in political consciousness, and the other in political 
institutions.”52 
On a similar note, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice David Souter has eloquently 
pointed out the contradictions inherent in the Constitution.53 Stating that desirable 
values can sometimes conflict with each other, Justice Souter states: 
The constitution is a pantheon of values, and a lot of hard cases
are hard because the Constitution gives no simple rule of decision 
for the cases in which one of the values is truly at odds with 
another. Not even its most uncompromising and unconditional
language can resolve the potential tension of one provision
with another, tension the Constitution’s Framers left to be
 resolved another day; and another day after that, for our cases
can give no answers that fit all conflicts, and no resolutions
51 Id., at 1802..
52 Id., at 1809. Woodrow Wilson had been an early propounder of the idea of a 
difference between viewing the Constitution as a machine or as an organism. 
Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (Columbia University 
Press,1908), cited in Encyclopedia of the American Constitution at 1633 (Second 
Edition, Edited by Leonard W. Levy and Kenneth L. Karst Macmillan Reference, 
2000). So also, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., had intimated a view of the 
Constitution as a living organism when he stated in Missouri v. Holland, that the 
words of the Constitution
・・・have called into life a being the development of which could not have
been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough
for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; … The case 
before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience, and not merely 
in that of what was said a hundred years ago. 
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
53 Justice David D. Souter, Harvard University’s 359th Commencement Address, 124 
Harvard Law Review 429 (2007).
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immune to rethinking when the significance of old facts may 
 have changed in the changing world.54 
The Modern Corporation was first published a bare two years before a major 
articulation of the concept of living constitutionalism in a judicial pronouncement.55 Its 
apparent contradictory stance on issues also accords with Justice Souter’s observation 
about contradictory values.
Berle and Means were remarkably perspicacious and prescient in their 
understanding of corporations and their growth. Subsequent developments over the 
decades have only confirmed and reinforced their exposition of how pervasive the hold 
of corporations had become in the economic, social, and political lives of individuals as 
employees, customers, suppliers, business competitors and as members of communities. 
The laws, the doctrines, and the norms of corporate law and corporate governance 
have fluctuated and evolved and been refined over the decades in accordance with the 
growth and evolution of corporations and their impact on society and the consequent 
change in social mores. 
The ubiquity of corporations in the present era and the seeming obviousness of 
their virtues and vices should not obscure the originality of the insights contained in 
The Modern Corporation and the book’s effectiveness in propelling them into public 
consciousness. Eminent thinkers and scholars such as John Kenneth Galbraith, Peter 
54 Id. at 435.
55 Chief Justice Hughes in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Hughes stated:
It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a century
ago, or to insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the 
vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our time. If by the 
statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it
means today, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution
must be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the 
conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed them, the 
statement carries its own refutation. 
(290 U.S. 398, at 422, 443). 
Justice Brennan of the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a strong case for living 
constitutionalism in William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: 
Contemporary Ratification, 27 South Texas Law Review 433 (1986). 
Justice Holmes’s famous dissenting judgment in Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 
(1905), also intimated a view of the constitution as a living document, albeit in the 
form of judicial deference to legislative experimentation.
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Drucker, and others have been influenced in various ways by The Modern Corporation. 56
The evolution of norms of corporate law and governance over the years are in 
accordance with Bruce Ackerman’s ideal of a living constitution that is shaped both 
by the adaptation of the law to accord with changing social mores, and as developing 
on the basis of popular sovereignty. The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Dodd-Frank Act are prominent instances of both.
The growth of corporations in the United States and the expansion of their reach 
and power in consonance with the changing economic, political, and social landscape 
have shaped the development of the law governing corporations and the norms 
relating to corporate governance. The principles of corporate law and the norms of 
corporate governance reflect Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous description of the 
nature of law in the opening paragraph of The Common Law. The passage reads:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy,…even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the 
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.
The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through many
Centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the 
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. … We must 
alternately consult history and existing theories of legislation. But 
the most difficult labor will be to understand the combination of 
the two into new products at every stage.57
Although written with reference to the common law, Holmes’s lines could aptly be 
used to express the idea of the living constitution.
VII. Conclusion:
The Modern Corporation and Private Property is one of the remarkable achievements 
56 See for example: John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Princeton 
University Press, 2007) (1967), and Peter F. Drucker, Management: Tasks, 
Responsibilities, Practices (Harper & Row, 1973).
57 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Common Law 1(Mark D. Wolfe Howe editor, Harvard 
University Press, 1967) (1881).
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in the history of legal and economic literature. The widespread influence of the book 
reveals itself in the prolific scholarly study that it continues to generate. One of the 
myriad prescient insights that the book contains is that due to the ubiquitous growth 
of corporations and their impact on the lives of individuals, corporate law had become 
akin to constitutional law for the new era. A study of the evolution of corporate law 
and the norms of corporate governance over the past century lends substance to this 
assertion.
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The Modern Corporation and Private Property
（近代株式会社と私有財産）
とコーポレート・ガバナンスの進化する基準
ダタール　ニティン
九州女子大学共通教育機構、北九州市八幡西区自由ヶ丘1-1（〒807-8586）
（2011年5月31日受付、2011年7月15日受理）
要　約
　金融危機調査委員会―これは近年の金融危機を調べるために、アメリカ合衆国が設立し
たものであるが、2011年1月27日にその報告書を提出した。その委員会が原因としたもの
が多くある中で、多くのすぐれた金融機関における、コーポレート･ガバナンスの失敗と危
機管理の失敗が挙げられた。コーポレート･ガバナンスの問題が、メディアからの注目を
浴びたのは、この10年で2度目のことであった。最初は、21世紀の初頭、有名な株式会社
が、証券市場においてひどく信頼を喪失した時に、企業が危機に陥った。多くの理由の中
でも、コーポレート･ガバナンスは、法律や経済、金融、経営や他の同族分野の中でも急成
長している分野の研究となっている。Adolf Berle とGardiner Meansの著作『The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property（近代株式会社と私有財産）』は、1932年に初版がでたが、
企業法とガバナンスの研究の基礎であり続けている。この本のすばらしい特徴は、その洞察
と意義の豊かさであり、そのため初版から約80年経た今でも企業法の学者の間で分析され、
論議をかもしだすものである。『The Modern Corporation and Private Property（近代株式会
社と私有財産）』は、企業法とガバナンスの大きな発展の短い記録とともに書かれているが、
その流れでこの論文では短い説明をしている。またこの論文は、卓越しているが故に、企業
法とコーポレート・ガバナンスの研究者の間で議論を重ね続けているこのテーマについて、
概観を呈示している。この論文で主張しているのは、『The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property（近代株式会社と私有財産）』の十分に評価されていない側面の一つは、新しい経
済時代への憲法と同様に、企業法の認識ということである。コーポレート・ガバナンスの進
化し続ける基準と、時代の緊急事態へそれを適用することにより、生きた憲法主義の論文に
ある、一つのパターンを明らかにするものである。
